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Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the 
Professionalization of College Athletics 
Erik M. Jensen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nothing could be more professional than big-time college foot-
ball and basketball teams:• colleges recruit and compensate 
coaches and athletes," impose admission charges for games, and de-
• Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. S.B., 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1967); M.A., University of Chicago (1972); J.D., Cor-
nell University (1979). The author is grateful to Robert 0. Bucklew, Jr., a 1986 graduate of 
the Case Western Reserve University School of Law, for his invaluable assistance-as al-
ways-in the preparation of this Article. 
1. For purposes of this Article, "big-time college football and bnsltetball teams" should 
be understood to mean those teams with aspirations for national collegiate championships 
and the financial success associated with such championships. In general-but with excep~ 
tiona-the colleges are those whose football teams compete in National Collegiate Athletic 
Association ("NCAA") Division I-A. Membership in the NCAA is divided into three divi-
sions, I, II, and III, with Division I further subdivided for football. Under the NCAA By~ 
laws, Division I has the most stringent requirements with respect to the number of varsity 
sports and the quality of opposition that the college must maintain, and it is the least re~ 
strictive in the number of athletic scholarships that may be awarded. At the other extreme, 
Division III schools offer no purely athletic scholarships. For a football team to qualify for 
Division 1-A, the college must also generally meet attendance and stadium size require~ 
menta. See NCAA Bylaws arts. 10-11, reprinted in 1985-86 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COL· 
LEGJATE ATHLETIC AssociATION 127-43 [hereinafter 1985-86 NCAA MANUAL]. 
The NCAA is a voluntary association, whose more than 800 members include almost all 
major colleges in the United States. See Waicukausld, The Regulation of Academic Stan-
dards in Intercollegiate Athletics, in LAW & AMATEUR SPORTS 161, 162, 182 n.14 (R. 
Waicukauski ed. 1982). Only 105 of those colleges compete in Division I~A football, however. 
NCAA. 1986 NCAA FooTBALL 293·340 (1986). 
The NCAA was formally organized as the Intercollegiate Athletic Association in 1906, 
after President Theodore Roosevelt threatened to abolish college football by executive order 
because of numerous incidents of brutality. Waicukauski, supra at 181 n.12; S. FIGLER, 
SPORT AND PLAY IN AMERlCAN LIFE 117~18 (1981)j S. FLEXNER, LISTENING TO AMERICA 245-46 
(1982). The NCAA's originally stated purpose was to maintain athletics "on an ethical plane 
in keeping with the dignity and high purpose of education." Waicukausld, supra at 182 n.13. 
2. The compensation provided to athletes consists, at least in part, of athletic scholar-
ships. The value of such a scholarship, representing required tuition, fees, and supplies, will 
not ordinarily be included in the athlete's gross income for federal income tax purposes. The 
Internal Revenue Service has ruled that an athletic scholarship, the value of which does not 
exceed tuition, fees, room, board, and necessary supplies, is excludable from gross income 
under I.R.C. § 117(a) (1982) when the college (1) expects but does not require the student's 
participation in a particular sport, (2) requires no particular activity in lieu of participation, 
and (3) does not cancel the scholarship if the student cannot participate. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 
35 
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rive substantial revenue from broadcasting. But the term "profes-
sional" is studiously avoided. Professionalism is inconsistent with 
the "myth of the 'student athlete,' "3 the idea that college athletes 
are Frank Merriwells• "who, in the off hours away from dedication 
to the books, happen to participate in organized sports. "• 
Insofar as it purports to describe reality, the myth may no 
longer have many believers; it is more common today to read of 
"horrors, indignities, and waste of human resources"" in connec-
tion with intercollegiate athletics. The myth nevertheless continues 
.to have enormous influence in shaping views about what college 
athletics should be, 1 and therefore it directly affects such matters 
1977-2 C.B. 47. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has narrowed the range of excludable 
amounts-expenses for room and board, for example, cannot constitute "qualified tuition 
and related expenses"-but it did not change the analysis involved in determining whether 
an award is a scholarship. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 123(a), 100 
Stnt. 2085 (amending I.R.C. § 117). 
The Revenue Ruling implies that an athletic scholarship is taxable if the scholarship is 
conditioned on athletic participation, but no cases have been reported on point, presumably 
because the Service has not aggressively pursued college athletes. Professor Kaplan has 
called the Ruling "naive ... since athletic awards are made to secure the nthlete's services 
and generally are maintained subject to his participation in college athletics." Kaplan, In-
tercollegiate Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1430, 
1462 (1980). See also Lee, The Taxation of Athletic Scholarships: An Uneasy Tension Be-
tween Benevolence and Consistency, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 591 (1985) (concluding that, under 
current law, athletic scholarships are subject to taxation, but recommending statutory 
changes}. 
3. See Austin, Book Review, 58 N.CL. REv. 660, 663 (1980). 
4. Created by Gilbert Patten (using the pen name Burt L. Standish), Frank Merriwell 
was a fictional Yale student athlete whose exploits from 1896 until about 1913 were avidly 
devoured by renders of popular periodicals. The stories generally extolled Merriwell's 
"manly virtues, righteousness, and accomplishment." S. FIGLER, supra note 1, at 114. Mer-
riwell had "a body like Tarzan's and a head like Einstein's," Patten, Gilbert, in TwENTIETH 
CENTURY AuTHORS 1083 (8. Kunitz & H. Haycraft eds. 1942), and he exemplified college 
athletes as "clean-living, idealistic students who played only for the love of the game and 
the glory of their schools." S. FLEXNER, supra note 1, at 251. However, Merriwell's lengthy 
tenure at Yale presaged the difficulties in graduating that later generations of athletes 
would have. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
5. Austin, supra note 3, at 663. The "amateur student-athlete is one who engages in a 
particular sport for the educational, physical, mental and social benefits derived therefrom 
and to whom participation in that sport is an avocation." NCAA CoNsT. art. 3, § 1, re-
printed in 1985-86 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 9; see also infra notes 18-31 and accom-
panying text. 
6. Austin, Bringing Free Enterprise to Big-Time College Sports, CnnoN. HIGHER 
Enuc., Mar. 23, 1981, at 25; see also infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text. 
7, The goal is amateurism, and that goal is sometimes given mystical significance. 
Pure amateurism can be traced to "the Victorian ideal , .. , the rationale for which is no 
longer the class prejudice which disdained professional athletes, but rather a respect for the 
'ritual tie' which once bound ancient sport to the realm of the sacred, an affinity· which is 
now threatened by the decline of amateurism." J. HoBERMAN, SPORT AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
152 (1984) (discussing Johan Huizinga's cultural philosophy of sport). Sport as religion (or a 
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as the level of legal compensation for athletes.' 
Nat everyone believes that the myth describes a worthwhile 
set of goals. Goals that are unattainable, and perhaps unapproach-
able, may have undesirable effects, including the breeding of cyni-
cism. Recently, a number of commentators who believe that the 
effect of the myth has been pernicious have suggested that it be 
discarded.' Colleges, they argue, should be able to hire athletes 
openly, without regard to whether the athletes are also scholars. 
Because belief in the student athlete is a fundamental tenet of the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association,'• however, the debate on 
the open hiring of college athletes is already vigorous.11 
This Article considers an issue that should play. a role in the 
debate on the hiring of college athletes, but that has been previ-
ously ignored: what effect, if any, would the creation of an openly 
professional athletic tea..m have on the federal income tax posture 
of an otherwise tax-exempt college?'" This issue is not a trivial 
religious substitute) is a common theme in the literature. See, e.g., M. NovAK, THE Jov OF 
SPORTS 284 (1976}: "In varsity sports, universities give the nation the most profound and 
nourishing popular art accessible to all our citizens. Our other religions are all, despite their 
universal aims, sectarian; their symbols and liturgies cannot unite as many as sports do." 
See also Austin, supra note 3, at 660 ("If Marx were alive, he would preach that sports, not 
religion, is the debilitating opiate of the masses."). 
8. For example, to preserve the "nonprofessional" nature of college athletics, the 
NCAA regulates the number and size of athletic scholarships an institution may offer and 
the compensation that may be paid to athletes for summer employment. See NCAA CaNST. 
art. 3, § 1, reprinted in 1985-86 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 9. 
9. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. 
10. See supra note 1. In a section headed "Fundamental Policy," the NCAA Constitu-
tion provides: 
The competitive athletics programs of the colleges are designed to be a vital part of 
the educational system. A basic purpose of this .A..ssociation is to maintain intercolle-
giate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as !ill 
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation 
between college athletics and professional sports. 
NCAA CaNST. art. 2, g 2, reprinted in 1985-86 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 7-8. 
Sportswriter R£ld Smith wrote: 
Whenever n college football game is on radio or televiEtion, it is accompanied by edify-
ing words about student. athletes, about the importance of intercollegiate athletics in 
a rounded educational program and about the vital role played by the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association, The edifying words are composed by writers for the 
N.C.A.A. 
Smith, The Student Athlete, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1979, at C3, col. 4, quoted in Austin, The 
Legality of Ticket Tie-Ins in Intercollegiate Athletics, 15 U. RicH. L. REv. 1, 9 n.35 (1980). 
ll. See, e.g., Should College Athletes Be Paid Salaries?, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., 
Dec, 23, 1985, at 56 (interviews with George SAge, who favors Aalnries for athletes, and 
NCAA President John Davis, who opposes such salnriefl). 
12. For a significant article that decidedly did not !gnore Ll)e relationship between in-
tercollegiate athletics and federal income texation, !lee Ke.plnn, supra note 2. !(aplan's arti-
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one. The tax liability at some institutions could exceed one million 
dollars." And the risk is real: this Article concludes that a college 
operating a professional team would almost certainly subject itself 
to the tax on unrelated business income. 
In the following section, the Article briefly discusses the rela. 
tionship of major college athletics to higher education" and then, 
in the third section, it describes one of the reactions to that rela-
tionship, the suggestion that athletes be openly hired!' The fourth 
section of the Article considers the application of the tax on unre-
.lated business income to an acknowledged system of collegiate pro-
fessional athletics!• The fifth section discusses an uncertainty that 
remains in determining how an institution's tax liability would be 
computed.17 
II. ATHLETICS AND EDUCATION 
At far too many colleges the term "student athlete" is an oxy-
moron. Although nominally students, many intercollegiate athletes 
are unprepared for, and uninterested in, higher education.18 For 
those athletes who do wish to participate in the life of the 
mind-to gain some idea, perhaps, why their academic institutions 
were founded-the time required by athletics precludes full atten-
cle is the beginning point for all analysis, and the ending point for most analysis, in this 
area. 
13. For example, the football team of Florida State University earned $6.5 million (not 
including contributions) in 1985 on expenditures of $2.5 million. Goodwin, When the Cash 
Register Is the Scoreboard, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, at 88, col. 1. If the football team is 
treated as a trade or business subject to the tax on unrelated business income, see infra 
notes 81-92 and accompanying text, with an applicable tax rate of 46%, see infra note 42, 
the tax liability on the $4 million of net revenue would be $1.84 million. Even with a reduc-
tion in the maximum corporate rate to 34% for future years, see id., the tax liability would 
be $1.36 million. 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 18-31. 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 32-39. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 40-80. 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 81-92. 
18. The academic standards mandated by the NCAA for athletic participation are not 
rigorous. For example, effective August 1, 1986, athletes at NCAA Division I schools, see 
supra note 1, who are to compete during their freshman year, must have attained a com-
bined Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") score of at least 700 and a high school grade point 
average of at least 2.0 (a "C" average) in certain core courses. See Gladwell, Dunk and 
Flunk, NEW REPUBLIC, May 19, 1986, at 13, 14; Monaghan, Remedial Studies for University 
of Georgia Athletes May Be o Thing of the Post, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Feb. 19, 1986, at 
29, 30. Although less than overwhelming, these standards are nonetheless intended to 
strengthen the earlier NCAA "2.0 rule," which included no minimum SAT requirement. The 
rule required only that a student have maintained a high school average of "C" for freshman 
eligibility. See Gladwell, supra, at 13-14. 
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tion to scholarly pursuits." 
The conflict between educational ideals and intercollegiate 
athletics is not a newly discovered phenomenon(" but recent mani-
festations of the conflict have been particularly striking. For exam-
ple, Jan Kemp, an instructor in remedial English at the University 
of Georgia, was fired in 1982 at least in part because she refused to 
give preferential treatment to athletes.21 Kemp not only resisted 
institutional pressure, a noteworthy event in itself, but also suc-
cessfully sued the University and its administrators.22 At trial the 
19. University of Maryland Chancellor John B. Slaughter, in the aftermath of the 
drug·related death of basltetball star Len Bins, noted that "intercollegiate athletics demands 
a great deal from a person who is involved in it, and it is perhaps too much." Bias Case May 
Spur Reform, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1986, at B12, col. I. Five of the twelve members of the 
Maryland baslcetball team flunked out of school during the 1986 spring semester, a period 
during which the team was, among other things, participating in its own Atlantic Coast 
Conference tournament and the NCAA tournament. !d.; see also Maryland's Athletes Fail 
at "Catch-up," USA Today, June 26, 1986, at 6C, col. 1 (discussing college athletes' difficul-
ties with academic pursuits). 
Longtime University of Alabama football conch Paul "Bear" Bryant addressed the rela-
tive weight given to athletics and academics: 
I used to go along with the idea that football playel'S on scholarship were "stu-
dent-athletes," which is what the NCAA cells them. Meaning a student first, an ath-
lete second. We were kidding ourselves, trying to make it more palatable to the aca-
demicians. We don't have to say that and we shouldn't. At the level we play, the boy 
is really an athlete first and a student second. 
Quoted in J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 203 (1976). 
20. See, e.g., H. SAVAGE, AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS (Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching 1929) (criticizing college "commercialized sports"); Turner, To 
the Alumni on Football, reprinted in CHRON. HIGHER Enuc., July 9, 1986, at 56 (1906 speech 
to University of Wisconsin alumni, noting that football "has become a business, carried on 
far too often by professionals, supported by levies on the public, bringing in vast gate re-
ceipts, demoralizing student ethics, and confusing the ideals of sport, manliness and de-
cency"}; supra note 1 (formation of NCAA}. No article on this subject should be written 
without quoting Andrew Dickson White, the first president of Cornell University. In 1873 
White forbade 30 Cornell football players from travelling to Cleveland, Ohio, to compete 
with the University of Michigan: "I will not permit 30 men to travel 400 miles merely to 
agitate a bag of wind." Quoted in S. FLEXNER, su.pra note 1, at 235. 
Excessive optimism is also not new. See, e.g., H. SAVAGE, J. McGovERN & H. BENTLEY, 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IH AMERICAN COLLEGE SPORT 53 (Carnegie Foundation for the Ad-
vancement of Teaching 1931): 
The deflation of American football has begun. In many respects it is an unpleasant 
process. Yet the poverty that results from n decline in football gate receipts will 
lighten parts of the task of those who administer college athletics. The return to a 
more sincere appreciation of the values of sports and sportsmanship is under way. 
The road, at times, seems long, but the American college will not weary in well-doing. 
21. The University's Division of Developmental Studies has served a disproportion-
ately high percentage of scholarship athletes in the past several years-15% versus about 
1.2% of the ove-rnll student population. Monaghan, supra note 1B, at 30. 
22. The federal court jury found that Kemp had been improperly dimnissed from her 
position and awarded her more than !S2.5 million, including $~.3 million in punitive dam-
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University made no attempt to camouflage its policy: the president 
and athletic director testified that denying admission to academi-
cally unqualified student athletes would constitute "unilateral dis-
armament" in the intercollegiate athletic wars." 
Jan Kemp prevailed, but Clemson University President Wil-
liam Atchley did not. In early 1985 several former Clemson coaches 
were indicted on charges of illegally possessing and distributing 
steroids to athletes. Atchley sought to remove the athletic director 
and to reorganize the athletic department. For his efforts, the 
.Clemson board of trustees suggested that he look elsewhere for 
employment. 24 
The Kemp and Atchley cases are merely dramatic examples of 
a deep-seated tension in academia." Data on the day-to-day edu-
cational performance of athletes at the nation's collegiate sports 
factories are even more disturbing. Graduation rates nationally for 
athletes appear to be lower than for nonathletes.26 At some schools 
the timely graduation of athletes, and in particular black athletes, 
is the exception rather than the rule. For example, only about 15 of 
the 200 black athletes who have represented the University of 
Georgia since 1969 have graduated.27 
ages. Monaghan, Fired Teacher Wins Suit Against Officials at University of Georgia, Is 
Awarded $2.5 Million, CHRON. HIGHER Enuc., Feb. 19, 1986, at 29 [hereinafter Monaghan 1]. 
The trial judge subsequently reduced the award to $680,000. Monaghan, Award to Ex-
Teacher at U. of Georgia Cut from $2.58 Million to $680,000, CHRON. HIGHER Enuc., Apr. 
30, 1986, at 33. But Kemp and the University officials later reached an agreement under 
which she would receive $1.08 million and be reinstated in her old position. Monaghan, 
Georgia Attorney General Chides University But Finds No Evidence of Illegal Activities, 
CnnoN. HIGHER Enuc., May 28, 1986, at 28. 
23. Monaghan I, supra note 22, at 30. 
24. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1985, at B9, col. 1. 
25. The incidents at the University of Georgia and Clemson University are used in this 
Article merely as examples. It is not the author's intention to suggest that conditions at 
those schools are any worse-or any better-than at others. See, e.g., Recent Scandals in 
College Sports, USA Today, June 27, 1986, at 10C, col. 1 (describing 32 "problems in Divi-
sion I athletic programs since Jan. 1, 1985"). 
26. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1459 & n.173. A study conducted by Richard 
Lapchick of the Center for the Study of Sport in Society, Northeastern University, deter-
mined that Jess than one-third of the participants in revenue-raising sports eventually grad-
uate. Becker, College Athletes Should Get Paid What They're Worth, Bus. WK., Sept. 30, 
1985, nt 18. 
The data are not totally one-sided on this issue; there is great uncertainty in determin-
ing what the appropriate comparisons are. See S. FIGLER, supra note 1, at 125-27. The 
NCAA president, citing a study by the American College Testing Program, has stated that 
the graduation rates for male athletes were 10% higher than for students generally for a 
five-year period ending in 1980. See Should College Athletes Be Paid Salaries?, supra note 
11 (interview with John Davis). 
27. Gladwell, supra note 18, at 13. According to the Georgia athletic director, between 
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The reason for the separation of athletes from the educational 
side of their institutions is no secret.'" Many colleges have become 
dependent on the revenue produced by their nonstudent students. 
"Universities have generally harvested more benefits than 
problems from their athletic departments and . . . [have been] 
content to leave the athletic departments alone."2° Football teams 
in particular may generate enormous revenue for their schools 
from ticket sales, from broadcasting contracts, and indirectly from 
contributions." As Jackie Sherrill bluntly put it when his salary as 
football coach at Texas A&M University was criticized, 
Football pays for a lot of things here . . . . It pays for the other 
sports. The salaries and the facilities come from the gifts, the schol-
arship fund, our fund-raising apparatus. Professors who complain, 
why, they don't spend their summers raising money for the school. 
Football is a business. Let's get our heads out of the sand." 
1974 and 1984 Georgia graduated 84?~ of the white males who had participated in intercol-
legiate athletics for four years; the corresponding figure for black male athletes was only 
37%. Monaghan, supra note 18, at 30. Only one-quarter of the nation's blnclt athletes grad-
uate from college, and three-quarters of those who do graduate receive degrees in physical 
education. Gladwell, supra note 18, at 13. 
28. See Austin, supra note 10, at 1: "The dynamics of operating a 'major' interco1le-
giate sports program have a tenuous nexus with academic ideals. Intercollegiate athletics is 
now a big business, dominated by the balance sheet of gate receipts, T.V. revenues, and 
talent recruiting." 
29. Goodwin, supra note 13. 
30. The 1985 University of Michigan footba11 team produced approximately $11 mil-
lion in gross revenue (of an overall athletic budget of more than $15 million): 
Ticket sales !~8,500,000 
Television & radio 550,000 
Participation in Fiesta Bowl 475,000 




Goodwin, supra note 13. Goodwin provides gross revenue and expense data for many other 
schools as well. See, e.g., .r;upra note 13. 
31. Quoted in W. MoRRIS, THE CounTING OF MARCUS DUPREE 335 (1983). Sherrill 
moved to Texas A&M in 1982 from the head coaching position at the University of Pitts-
burgh. His A&M contract provided for approximately $267,000 per year in cash and fringe 
benefits, paid in part by the university and in part by alumni. At the time that was the 
highest compensation paid for any position at an American college. [d. at 332-33. 
Academics' condescending resentment of college athletics has a long history, see supra 
note 20 (quotation of A.D. White), but Novak argues that much of the academic feeling of 
superiority is unjustified. The professoriate overeatimat£:s the intellectual level, and the soci-
etal value, of its own pursuits: 
Most of the faculty and graduates of univeraities engage in quite pedestrian and 
worltaday intellectual teslts .... Most ... think their work is more important than 
that of coaches and players. Economically and socially, however, it would be difficult 
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Some heads may have been buried in the sand when Sherrill 
spoke, but they were not the heads of administrators at the major 
athletic colleges. 
Ill. OPEN PROFESSIONALISM: AN END TO HYPOCRISY? 
Can colleges with big-time athletic programs reconcile their 
crass practices in student athletics with the noble educational pur-
poses for which they were founded? Should they even try? Many 
prominent commentators, including a leading Chicago School econ-
omist," the editors of The New York Times," and novelist James 
A. Michener," have recently argued that colleges should stop seek-
ing a reconciliation of practice and purpose and should instead 
openly hire athletes, athletes who need not pretend to be 
scholars." 
for them to prove that their work does have larger public significance. Indeed, that 
difficulty is the source of much resentment. 
M. NOVAK, supra note 7, at 282-83. 
32. Becker, supra note 26, at 18. Becker convincingly argues that the NCAA, through 
its restrictions on scholarships and other compensation to athletes, "reduce[s] the competi-
tion among colleges for players in football and basketball." Jd. This classic labor-mnrket 
cartel is blessed by Congress and the courts, even though it has the effect of "lower[ing] the 
earnings of young black and other athletes with limited opportunities."Jd.,· see also Koch, A 
Troubled Cartel: The NCAA, 38 LAW & CoNTEMP. Pnons. 135 (1973) (viewing NCAA as 
cartel); McCormick, Colleges Get Their Athletes for a Song, Wall Street J., Aug. 20, 1985, 
at 28 (NCAA limits competition between colleges to "prevent the monetary value generated 
by fine athletes from going to the athletes"). McKenzie and Sullivan respond that college 
athletes are not materially underpaid "in any absolute or relative sense" when the present 
value of expected future earnings is taken into account, and that an organization like the 
NCAA with more than 800 members cannot operate as a classic carteL McKenzie & Sulli-
van, Is the NCAA a Cartel? Absolutely Not., NAT'L L.J., May 5, 1986, at 13. However, few 
college athletes join professional teams. "The skills they possess that have a market value 
may only be sold while they are in the college athletic market." McCormick, supra. 
33. "But if the country won't go cold honest, let it at least recognize that many players 
are not serious students, need to be recruited with money and paid at least something while 
in school." N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1985, at A26, col. l. 
34. Michener stated: 
It is quite obvious that intercollegiate football and basketball, aa now played, are 
semi-professional sports in most schools and professional in others. This should be 
publicly acknowledged; I see nothing to be gained by denying it and much to be lost. 
My concern is therefore how best to administer a professional entertainment program 
within the normal guidelines that now operate, and I would wish to hear no com-
plaint that 11Things oughtn't to be this way in a self-respecting institution of higher 
learning," because-they are that way and our society intends that they remain that 
way. 
J. MICHENER, supra note 19, at 196. 
35. Some elected officials have made similar suggestions. For example, for several 
years Nebraska State Senator Ernest Chambers has introduced legislation that, if enacted, 
would treat University of Nebraska football players as state employees. Goodwin, Proposals 
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Professional college athletic programs could arguably provide 
several benefits. The reconstituted programs would continue to 
generate income for the institutions while reducing the present hy-
pocrisy of college athletics." Moreover, athletes, particularly those 
from poor backgrounds, could be provided much needed funds in 
return for the services that they provide their colleges. 31 If a col-
lege could support its physics department, reduce hypocrisy, and 
alleviate hardship by fielding a professional football team, why 
should it not do so? 
The combination of money, honesty, and social services would 
be hard to beat-if in fact that combination could be realized. For 
a number of reasons, however, an openly professional athletic pro-
gram could actually diminish revenues. Moreover, whatever the 
overall effect on revenue, it is almost certain that little or nothing 
would be generated to aid academic departments. 
To begin with, the popularity of college athletics may depend 
on the hypocrisy. It is impossible to prove in advance, but enthu-
siasm might wane if we were to stop pretending that the people 
wearing the helmets are common, everyday college students. 
In addition, at many an institution the direct revenue from 
football and men's basketball (the only serious revenue-raisers for 
most schools) merely supports the rest of a bloated athletic pro-
for Reform, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1986, at D25, col. 1; see Cross, The College Athlete and 
the Institution, 38 LAW & Cm•ITEMP. Pnons. 151, 164·65 (1973} {college athletes not generally 
"employees" under existing law). But see Yasser, Are Scholarship Athletes at Big-Time 
Programs Really Uniuersity Employees?- i'ou Bet They Are!, 9 BLACK L.J. 65 (1984). 
36. Compensation packages could be tailored to accommodate those with, as well as 
those without, serious academic desires. Austin has described two basic compensation plana 
that could be provided to athlete employees. For the serious would~be scholar, the college 
could provide free education (and maybe more), with graduation expected to occur within 
five or six years. During his worldng athletic season, the athlete would not be required to 
attend classes. For the athlete with no scholarly aspirations, the employment relationship 
would be full-time. During the off~season, the employee would be expected to perform other 
functions for the college. Austin, supra note 6, at 25; see also Punt the Pretense, NEw RE~ 
PUBLIC, Sept. B, 1986, at 8 (arguing for a position "[b]etween outright professionalism and 
small~college amateurism," including tailoring educational requirements to athletes' abili~ 
ties, and providing annual payment to athletes equal to cash value of their scholarships, 
with receipt of half of the payment deferred until completion of degree programs). 
Another commentator has suggested a variation on the employment relationship: col-
leges should be able to sign athletes to long-term contracts, not to protect the athlete, but so 
that a professional team interested in the services of the athlete would be required to 
purchase the contract from the college. At least some of the costs of training for the openly 
professipnal athletic activity would be shifted, therefore, from the college to the professional 
sports enterprise. Koch, supra note 32, at 149; Koch, The Economics of "Big~ Time" Inter~ 
collegiate Athletics, 52 Soc. Set Q. 248, 260 (1971). 
37. See supra note 32. 
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gram.38 If benefits to the physics department are provided at all, 
they are indirect, through increased alumni donations, student ap-
plications,'" and legislative appropriations. 
Finally, those who advocate open professionalism seem to have 
ignored something the rest of us can never ignore: taxes. As the 
rest of this Article explains, adoption of an overtly professional 
athletic system may result in colleges' becom;..,g subject to the tax 
on unrelated business income, thereby depleting the funds availa-
ble for other uses. 
IV. THE TAX ON UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME 
Even in those unusual fiscal years in which a tax-exempt col-
lege has net revenue,' 0 the college does not pay federal tax on tui-
tion and other income attributable to its educational activities." 
38. See Hanford, Controversies in College Sports, 60 Eouc. REc. 351, 363-64 (1979). In 
recent years a number of university athletic depa;:tments (such as those of Michigan, Geor-
gia, and Stanford) have been separately incorporated. These departments (and many others 
that are not distinct legal entities) are expected to be economically self-sufficient, paying 
their universities for services provided but otherwise making no cash contributions that di-
rectly affect academic departments. Goodwin, supra note 13. NCAA President John P. Da-
vis notes, "A lot of people wish to turn the clock back to where the game on Saturday was 
just a game between bonn fide students. But it's a fact of life that we just can't support all 
of the sports without the gate receipts and television money we're getting." Quoted in Good-
win, supra note 35, at D30, col. 1. 
39. For example, applications to Auburn University increased by 38% from 1983 to 
1986, the period during which Heisman Trophy winner Bo Jackson was playing football for 
the school. It Pays to Win . .. Or To Lose, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, at 88, col. 1. A recent 
study conducted at Clemson University concluded that the spillover effects of a successful 
athletic program are substantial: "[D]ollars invested in the athletic program reap rewards in 
terms of success and national exposure that benefit the entire university." Clemson's ath-
letic successes have, among other things, increased the amount of the average donation. See 
Clark, The Business of Education: Does Athletics Help or Hurt?, Wall Street J., Aug. 26, 
1986, at 25 (discussing paper by McConniclt & Tinsley, "Athletics vs. Academics," pub-
lished by the Center for Policy Studies, College of Commerce and Industry, Clemson 
University). 
40. This assumes that the concept of "net revenue" has meaning in this context. How-
ever, measuring the net revenue of a nonprofit enterprise is a difficult conceptual task be-
cause basic accounting principles "rest on the premise that the organization seelts to maxi-
mize its profit." Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations From 
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 307 (1976). What expenses should be deducti-
ble, for example, to an organization that by definition does not have "ordinary and neces-
sary" business expenses? Id. at 309-12. 
41. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1982) provides generally that certain organizations are exempt 
from federal income tax. Among the protected organizations are the so-called "50l(c){3)" 
organizations, a category that includes most colleges: 
Corporations [or other organizations] ... organized and operated exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes 
... , no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
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Like other tax-exempt institutions, however, a college is taxed, at 
the rates applicable to corporations," on "unrelated business taxa-
ble income." "Unrelated business taxable income" in general is in-
come from (1) a "trade or business" that is (2) "regularly carried 
on," but that is (3) "not substantially related" to the institution's 
exempt purposes43-for a college, its educational pmposes." 
The tax on unrelated business income has two overlapping 
purposes, protecting the Treasury from loss of revenue and pro-
tecting taxpaying entities from unfair competition. First, the tax is 
intended to prevent otherwise taxable activities from being insu-
lated from taxation, thereby denying the Treasury its share of the 
holder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on prop· 
aganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, ... and which does not par-
ticipate in, or intervene in, ... any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for 
public office. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982) (emphasis added). The effect of section 501(c)(3) status is not 
merely to make an institution generally tax-exempt. More important, contributions made to 
such an organization will be deductible, subject to certain statutory limitations. I.R.C. § 
170(a), (c) (1982). 
If a substantial part of an institution's revenue comes from sources unrelated to its 
exempt purposes, either the institution may not quali(v as a "501(c)(3)" organization in the 
first place, or its exempt status may be subject to revocation. One commentator has sug~ 
gested that denial or revocation is lilcely if more than one~half of the annual revenue is 
regularly derived from unrelated activities. B. HoPttJNS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT OnGANIZA-
TIONS 1986 SUPPLEMENT 250 (citing Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,IOB (May 2B, 1982)). This Article, 
however, assumes that the level of professional athletic activity at any college will not be so 
great that denial or revocation of tax-exempt status is lilcely. 
42. I.R.C. § 5ll(a)(1) (1982). For taxable years beginning before July 1, 1987, corpora-
tions are generally subject to a graduated rate structure, rising from 15% on the first 
$25,000 of taxable income to 46% on ta:mble income above $100,000. However, corporations 
with taxable income of more than $1 million lose some or all of the benefits of graduation. If 
taxable income exceeds $1.4 million, all of the income will be taxed at the maximum 46% 
rate. I.R.C. § ll(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985). For taxable years beginning after June 30, 1987, 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 generally reduces the rate structure, with a top rate of 34%, 
but the benefits of graduation are phased out at lower levels, beginning at a taxable income 
of $100,000. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 601, 100 Stat. 2085 (amending I.R.C. § ll(b)). 
43. I.R.C. §§ 511(a), 512(a)(1), 513(a) (1982). The statute, subject to certain modifica-
tions, requires computing the groos income derived from the unrelated trade or business and 
subtracting those deductions directly connected with the unrelated trade or business. I.R.C. 
§ 512(a)(1) (1982). The modifications provided in section 512(b) protect college endowment 
income from application of the tax by excluding most passive investment income (among 
other things) from the computations of a section 501(c)(3) organization. But sec I.R.C. § 514 
(1982) (including unrelated debt~financed income in unrelated business income). 
44. "Educational" is defined in the regulations as relating to: 
(a) The instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or 
developing his capabilities; or 
(b) The instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficinl 
to the community. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.50l(c)(3)·1(d)(3)(i) (1986). 
46 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1987: 35 
profits. When Congress considered this provision as part of the 
Revenue Act of 1950," it was influenced by the close economic ties 
between New York University and various commercial enterprises, 
including the C.F. Mueller Company.•• Mueller, the country's larg-
est producer of macaroni and other pasta products, assigned all of 
its income to the benefit of the NYU law school. Because, as a so-
called "feeder" organization, Mueller simply t·ansferred its net in-
come to a tax-exempt educational enterprise, Mueller took the po-
sition that it, too, was not subject to federal income taxation. Al-
though Mueller lost in the Tax Court,'" it prevailed before the 
Third Circuit in 1951.'6 
While Mueller was wending its way through the federal court 
system, many congressmen became concerned about the effect of a 
decision adverse to the government. In Representative Dingell's 
words, if such feeder organizations are tax-exempt,'" "[e]ventually 
all the noodles produced in this country will be produced by corpo-
rations held or created by universities . . . and there will be no 
45. Pub. L. No. 81-814, §§ 301, 331, 64 Stat. 906, 947, 957. The present form of the 
statute can be traced to the 1950 Act. The class of organizations to which the tax may apply 
was extended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(a)(1), 83 Stat. 487, 
536, to include nearly all tax·exempt institutions. See B. HoPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-ExEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 615-16 (4th ed. 1983); Donahue, Unrelated Business Income of Tax Exempt 
Organizations, 37 lNsT. ON FED. TAx'N § 27.03, at 27-6 (1979}. 
46. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 106 S. Ct. 2426, 2435 {1986) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 40, at 318-19; Note, The Macaroni Mo-
nopoly: The Developing Concept of Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 
81 HAnv. L. REV. 1280, 1281 (1968); Comment, Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act of 
1950, 60 YALE L.J. 850, 850 (1951). 
47. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 922 (1950}. 
48. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 {3d Cir. 1951}. In effect, the Third 
Circuit applied the "destination of income" test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Trini-
dad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicndores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924} (statutory provision ''says 
nothing about the source of income, but makes destination the ultimate test of exemption"). 
The Tax Court announced that it would not follow the Third Circuit's decision in 
Mueller. See Joseph B. Eastman Corp. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1502, 1509 (1951); Myers, 
Taxing the Colleges, 38 ConNELL L.Q. 368, 372-73 (1953). Under the curious jurisdictional 
rules applicable in the tax area, the Tax Court can (and often does) refuse to follow a con-
trary decision of a court of appeals in subsequent cases, unless those cases would be appeal-
able to the same circuit. See generally Geier, The Emasculated Role of Judicial Precedent 
in the Tax Court and Internal Revenue Service, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 427 (1986}. 
49. Prior to the Revenue Act of 1950, a number of courts had held that an organiza-
tion feeding a tax-exempt organization was itself exempt from federal income tax. See, e.g., 
Roche's Beach v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 {2d Cir. 1938) (income of bathing beach corpo-
ration fed to exempt foundation held exempt}; Comment, supra note 46, at 862-63. The 
Third Circuit in Mueller followed the decision in Roche's Beach. Mueller, 190 F.2d at 122. 
See Note, supra note 46, at 1281 ("Mueller Company differed only in scale from Roche's 
Beach"). 
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revenue to the Federal Treasury from this industry."'" The 1950 
Act took two steps to guard the Treasury from a significant loss of 
revenue. First, it eliminated the tax protection of feeder organiza-
tions. 51 Second, to keep an institution like NYU from merely mov-
ing macaroni production in-house, the Act provided for theoreti-
cally identical treatment for unrelated trades or businesses that 
are operated directly by tax-exempt orga11izations. Thus, macaroni 
profits would be taxed whether produced by a separate legal entity 
or by the otherwise tax-exempt organization itself. 62 
The tax on unrelated business income was intended not only 
to protect Treasury revenues, but also to prevent tax-exempt orga-
nizations from gaining a competitive advantage over taxpaying en-
tities by engaging in similar profit-making activities. If, for exam-
ple, Columbia University were able to operate a department store 
in mid-Manhattan and pay no federal tax on the income from the 
store, one fear is that Columbia could undercut Macy's and Bloom-
ingdale's. Whether price undercutting would in fact occur in a 
competitive market is not clear." But even if Columbia's store did 
not lower its prices, it would still be able to accumulate capital 
more rapidly than its nonexempt competitors-to "use [its] profits 
tax-free to expand operations."" The tax on unrelated business in-
50. Revenue Reuision of 1950: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, Slst Cong., 2d Sess. 580 (1950). 
51. I.R.C. § 502(a) (1982) provides that "an organization operated for the primary pur-
pose of carrying on a trade or business for profit shall not be exempt from taxation ... on 
the ground that all of its profits are payable to one or more organizations exempt from 
taxation." 
Although a feeder corporation that transfers funds to a section 50l(c)(3) organization 
might be entitled to a deduction for charitable contributions, see supra note 41, I.R.C. § 
170(b)(2) (1982) limits a corporation's deduction to 10% of its taxable income. If there were 
no such percentage limitation, a nominally ta'!:able feeder could effectively achieve exempt 
status through the charitable deduction. 
52. The congressional committee reports mal{e it clear that tax results should not de-
pend on whether income is earned by a charitable organization directly or earned by a dis-
tinct legal entity and "fed" to the charitable organization. H.R. REP. No. 2319, Blat Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1950), reprinted in 1950·2 C.B. 380, 409; S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 
reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 483, 505. 
53. Pricing decisions are subject to complex economic considerations beyond the scope 
of this Article. A number of commentators have suggested that price cutting is unlikely. See, 
e.g., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 40, at 319 & n.47; Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1465-66; 
Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV, 
1017, 1020·21 (1982). 
54. H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 52, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. at 409; S. Rep. No. 
2375, supra note 52, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. at 504.-See Treas. Reg.§ 1.513-1(b) (1975); 
United States v. American Bar Endowment, 106 S. Ct. 2426, 2435 & n.1 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); United States v. American College of Physicians, 106 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (1986) 
("Congress perceived a need to restrain the unfair competition fostered by the ta:r. la.ws. "); 
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come is intended to eliminate this possible competitive disparity. 
Would income from professional athletics be unrelated busi-
ness income to a college? Of the three statutory requirements for 
imposition of the tax," only one is subject to serious doubt, at 
least at a threshold level." Even without open professionalism, it is 
reasonably clear that all or part of the athletic program today at 
some institutions rises to the level of n "trade 'lr business," charac-
terized by a search for profit, 07 and that the constituent parts of a 
H.R. REP. No. 413, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 232 ("business 
competing with taxpaying organizations should not be granted an unfair competitive advan-
tage by operating tax free unless the business contributes importantly to the exempt func-
tion"); Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1466; Note, supra note 46, at 1281-82. Indeed, it may be 
that nonprofit institutions have competitive advantages even without favorable tax treat-
ment-because of favorable public images, lower labor costs, and subsidies through govern-
ment grants and private donations. Copeland & Rudney, Business Income of Nonprofits 
and Competitiue Aduantage, 33 TAX NOTES 747, 748 (Nov. 24, 1986}; see also Copeland & 
Rudney, Business Income of Nanprofits and Campetitiue Aduantage-II, 33 TAx NOTES 
1227 (Dec. 29, 1986} (discussing competitive advantage of mutunla and cooperatives). But 
see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 53, at 1036-39 (arguing for repeal of tax on unrelated busi-
ness income because tax encourages a nonprofit institution to concentrate in areas "related" 
to its tax-exempt status, thus potentially harming for-profit firms doing business in those 
areas); Comment, Preuenting the Operation of Untaxed Business by Tax-Exempt Organi-
zations, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 581, 591-92 (1965) (tax-exempt business has no competitive ad-
vantage in practice). 
55. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
56. But see infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of what the taxa-
ble trade or business might be. 
57. "'[T]rade or business' includes any activity which is carried on for the production 
of income from the sale of goods or the performance of services." I.R.C. § 513(c) (1982}, 
added by Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(c), 83 Stat. 487, 542-43; see 
Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1438-39. "IF] or purposes of section 513 the term 'trade or business' 
has the same meaning it has in section 162"-that is, the ordinary and necessary business 
expense section. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1975). The critical test for "trade or business" 
under I.R.C. § 162 is profit motive. Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir. 
1984); see United States v. American Bar Endowment, 106 S. Ct. 2426, 2430 & n.1 (1986); 
see generally Professional Ina. Agents v. Commissioner, 726 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984) (selec-
tion of specific insurance program based on amount of insurance premiums shared by tax-
exempt organization subjects organization to unrelated business tax); Carolinas Farm & 
Power Equip. Dealers v. United States, 699 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1983) (rebates from group 
insurance program are unrelated business income to tax-exempt organization). 
Passive investment income thus may not be attributable to a "trade or business" be-
cause neither the sale of goods nor the performance of services is involved. However, the use 
of "includes" rather than "means" in I.R.C. § 513(c) is equivocal. See Hopkins & Kaplan, 
Could Ditunno and Hoopengarner Result in Expanding the Scope of Unrelated Business?, 
60 J. TAx'N 40, 41 (1984). Passive income is in any case generally removed from the tax 
computations of a section 501(c)(3) organization by I.R.C. § 512(b) (1982). See supra note 
43. 
The statute also specifically excludes from taxation certain activities that rise to the 
level of a trade or business but that Congress nonetheless thought were entitled to protec-
tion: those activities (1) in which substantially all the work is performed without compensa-
tion; (2) that are carried on primarily for the convenience of the organization's "members, 
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full-fledged athletic program are "regularly carried on."'" The criti-
cal inquiry, therefore, will usually be whether the activity is "sub-
stantially related" to the institution's exempt purposes. Under reg-
ulations promulgated in 1967, the dispositive question is whether 
the trade or business, although motivated in part by a desire for 
income, "contribute[s] importantly to the accomplishment of [the 
exempt] purposes. "50 
As a theoretical matter, determining whether a trade or busi-
ness "contributes importantly" requires an analysis of the facts of 
each case.•• Significant facts include the level of profits (the 
greater the profits, the more likely the trade or business is unre-
lated);" the scope of the activity in comparison with the organiza-
tion's exempt purposes (the more the activity overwhelms the 
clearly exempt functions of the enterprise, the greater the prob-
students, patients, officers, or employees," such as a college's operation of a laundry to wash 
dormitory linen; or (3) that involve the selling of merchandise, substantially all of which 
was received by the organization as gifts or contributions. I.R.C. § 513(a) (1982); Tress. Reg. 
§ 1.513~1(e) (1971). Only the first exception can even arguably apply to intercollegiate nth· 
letics nnd "student athletes," end its application is unlikely. Athletic scholarships may not 
constitute taxable compensation to the recipients, see supra note 2, but they may well con-
stitute compensation for purposes of I.R.C. § 513(a). Even if the scholarships are not com-
pensation, any college athletic department has other "clearly compensated employees" 
among its coaches, administrators, and support staff. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1460-63. 
58. The regulations state that ordinarily a trade or business will be treated as "regu-
larly carried on" if the business activities "manifest a frequency and continuity, and are 
pursued in a manner, generally similar to comparable commercial activities of nonexempt 
organizations." Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1) {1967). The fact that a football team's season is 
limited to a less-than-annual period thus should not affect the conclusion that the team's 
operations are "regularly carried on." See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1449-50. 
59. Tress, Reg. § 1.513-l{d)(2) {1967). For taxable years beginning prior to December 
13, 1967, the regulations provided that an activity was "substantially related" only "if the 
principal purpose of such trade or business is to further ... the purpose for which the 
organization is granted exemption." Tress. Reg. § 1.513-2(a)(4) (1968) (emphasis added). 
Under this standard, an activity was unrelated unless its primary objective was furthering 
the exempt purpose. See Iowa State Univ. v. United SLates, 500 F.2d 508, 520 (Ct. Cl. 1974) 
(~'the commercial aspects and the emphasis on revenue maximization were the overwhelm-
ing goals of the operation of the [television] station; and, thus, the business was not sub-
stantially related to the educational purposes of the University"); Kaplan, supra note 2, at 
1450-51. The new regulatory standard thus liberalized the protection for profit-making ac-
tivities of exempt organizations. 
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1) (1968). See United States v. American College of Phy. 
aicians, 106 S. Ct. 1591, 1599-1600 (19S6) (emphasis in original): "[T]he statute provides 
that a tax will be imposed on 'any trade or business the conduct of which is not substan-
tially related,' ... directing our focus to the manner in which the tax-exempt organization 
operates its business." 
61. See, e.g., Carle Foundation v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1198 (7th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). 
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!em);•• and the content of the activity (the less the educational or 
other tax-exempt component, the more likely the imposition of the 
tax).•• If big-time intercollegiate athletic programs in their present 
forms were to be carefully analyzed under these principles, many 
would fare poorly: 
The available evidence does show . . . that a great many athletic 
programs probably do have the characteristic• of an "unrelated 
trade or business." ... [T]hese programs are profit-motivated, at 
least in part; they are regularly carried on; and they have ventured 
far beyond the club sports model generally thought to promote edu-
cational values. •• 
As a practical matter, however, college athletic programs have 
not been carefully analyzed, except by one commentator.•• Lan-
guage in the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1950 has 
been given an interpretation so favorable to colleges that nothing 
was left to decide-or so it has seemed. 
When the unrelated business t&Xing scheme was being imple-
mented, Congress only perfunctorily considered the application of 
the tax to intercollegiate athletics. The House Ways and Means 
Co=ittee and the Senate Finance Co=ittee heard no testimony 
62. Tress. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3) (1968) provides: 
[T]he size and extent of the activities involved must be considered in relation to the 
nature and extent of the exempt function which they purport to serve. Thus, where 
... activities ... are conducted on a larger scale than is reasonably necessary for 
performance of such functions the ... portion ... in excess of the needs of the 
exempt functions constitutes ... [an] unrelated trade or business. 
63. For example, a university that sponsors professional theater companies and sym-
phony orchestras will not have unrelated business income from the activities even though 
the productions are open not only to students and faculty but also to the general public. 
"[T]he presentation of such drama and music events contributes importantly to the overall 
educational and cultural function of the university." Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv}, ex. (2) 
(1968). 
Activities performed in a commercial manner may be treated as unrelated trades or 
businesses. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iii) (1967) ("asset or facility necessary to 
the conduct of exempt functions may also be employed in a commercial endeavor"); c/. Rev. 
Rul. 85-110, 1985-2 C.B. 166 (revenue from laboratory testing performed for private patients 
of exempt hospital's staff physicians held unrelated business income if laboratory services 
otherwise available in community). Two courts ·have recently rejected the government's ar-
gument that income from scientific research that could have been undertaken by commer-
cial laboratories was necessarily unrelated business income. llT Research lnst. v. United 
States, 9 Cl. Ct. 1, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9734 (1985); Midwest Research InsL v. 
United States, 554 F. Supp. 1379 (W.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd per curiam, 744 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 
1984}; see Simpson & Powell, Does Income of Exempt Scientific Research Organizations 
Come From Unrelated Business?, 64 J. TAX'N 210 (1986). 
64. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1471. 
65. See id. 
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on the issue, but reports of both committees nevertheless baldly 
asserted that "[a]thletic activities of schools are substantially re-
lated to their educational functions."'' Accordingly, without appar-
ent hesitation, the committees concluded, "Of course, income of an 
educational organization from charges for admissions to football 
games would not be deemed to be income from an unrelated busi-
ness, since its athletic activities are substantially related to its edu-
cational program. "67 
That conclusion should not have been an easy one even in 
1950. Nevertheless, as a result of the conclusory statements in the 
legislative history, college sports have since enjoyed an exalted tax 
position. In 1977 the Internal Revenue Service briefly tried to 
carve out an area of taxability for revenues from broadcasting 
sports events.•• The Service's aggressive posture was short-lived, 
however. College athletics are extremely popular, and public reac-
tion was instantaneous. After a firestorm of protest, the Service 
decided, in a series of unpublished 1978 National Office Technical 
Advice Memoranda,•• that "there is no meaningful distinction be-
tween exhibiting the game in person to 100,000 people and exhibit-
ing the game on television to a much larger audience where both 
groups of people may be made up not only of students. "70 With 
66. H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 52, reprinted in 1950~2 C.B. at 409; 8. REP. No. 
2375, supra note 52, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. at 505. 
67. H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 52, reprinted in 1950-2 C,B. at 458 {emphasis 
added); 8. REP, No. 2375, supra note 52, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. at 559 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, a college "would not be taxable on income derived from a basketball tournament 
sponsored by it, even where the teams were composed of studenls of other achools." H.R. 
REP. No. 2319, supra note 52, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. at 409; 8. REP. No. 2375, supra note 
52, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. at 505; see lCaplan, supra note 2, at 1436. The committees 
perhaps considered college athletic events to be like the presentation of plays and musical 
events by students and faculty, activities now specifically protected by the regulations. See 
Trens. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(i), ex. (1) (1967). 
68. The Service notified several universities and the Cotton Bowl Athletic Association, 
a tax-exempt entity that presents the annual Cotton Bowl football game, that revenue from 
the broadcasting rights to the game would constitute unrelated business income. See B. 
HoPKINS, supra note 45, et 637. Feeling bound by the legislative history, the Service con-
ceded that gate receipta were not subject to the tax. The committee reports were silent on 
the broadcasting issue, however, presumably because revenues from such sources were in-
consequential in 1950, see Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-002 (no date given), and the Service trierl 
to take advantage of this gap in the legislative history. 
69. The memoranda held that unrelated business income wos not created by univer-
sity sales of broadcast rights to football and basketball games, Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-002 
(no date given), 78-51-005 (no date given), and 78-5!-006 (no date given); by the sale of 
broadcasting rights by an amateur athletic union, Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-003 (no date 
given); and by the sale of broadcasting rights by a football bowl association, Tech. Adv. 
Mern. 78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978). 
70. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-002 (no date given), 78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978), and 78-51-
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these memoranda and two similar Revenue Rulings published in 
1980,71 the Service admitted defeat, at least temporarily, and 
adopted a hands-off position toward intercollegiate athletics. 
It is altogether too easy to conclude from the history of the 
past thirty-seven years that college athletic programs are necessa-
rily immune from the tax on unrelated business income. It is clear, 
however, that the Internal Revenue Service's concession on broad-
casting revenue, like the longtime exemption of gate receipts, was 
premised on the student nature of the activities. In one of the pub-
lished rulings, for example, the Service stated, "An athletic pro-
gram is considered to be an integral part of the educational process 
of a university, and activities providing necessary services to stu-
dent athletes and coaches further the educational purposes of the 
university."72 Moreover, the 1978 technical advice memoranda elo-
quently, almost reverently, extolled the student athlete in provid-
ing justifications, which the 1950 congressional committee reports 
had failed to provide, for connecting intercollegiate athletics with 
education: 
[A]n audience for a game may contribute importantly to the educa-
tion of the student-athlete in the development of his/her physical 
and inner strength and to the education of the student hody and the 
community-at-large in heightening interests in and knowledge about 
the participating schools. In regard to the student-athlete, the 
knowledge that an event is being observed heightens its significance, 
which raises the levels of both competitive effort and enjoyment. At-
tending the game enhances student interest in education generally 
and in the institution because such interest is whetted by exposure 
to a school's athletic activities. Moreover, the games (and the oppor-
tunity to observe them) foster those feelings of identification, loy-
alty, and participation typical of a well-rounded educational 
experience. 73 
The rationale for not taxing major college athletic programs is 
006 (no date given). 
71. Rev. Rul. 80~295, 1980M2 C.B. 194 (sale of broadcasting rights by amateur athletic 
union not unrelated trade or business); Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195 (sale of broadcast-
ing rights to annual intercollegiate event by tax-exempt body not unrelated trade or busi-
ness). See generally Thompson & Young, Taxing the Sale of Broadcast Rights to College 
Athletics-An Unrelated Trade or Business?, 8 J. CaLL. & UL. 331 (1982). 
72. Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195, 195 (emphasis added); see Rev. Rul. 67-291, 
1967-2 C.B. 184 (nonprofit organization that subsidizes training table for university's ath-
letic teams furthers educational program of university and may be an l.R.C. § 50l(c){3) 
organization). 
73. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-002 (no date given), 78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978), 78-51-005 
(no date given), and 78-51-006 (no date given). 
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thus grounded in quicksand. A reader of the proffered justifica-
tions must pretend that the state of major college athletics is 
something other than what he knows it to be.74 The pretense is 
quite valuable for supporters of college athletics because it helps 
insulate the institutions from the inquiries of the Internal Revenue 
Service, but it is nonetheless a pretense. The effect of openly 
professionalizing college athletics would be to undo those thirty-
seven years of favorable history. If colleges stop pretending that 
their athletic programs are related to the greater educational en-
terprise-that is, if the athletic teams are composed of acknowl-
edged professionals, with no direct educational connection to the 
colleges except revenue-raising-the tax on unrelated business in-
come will necessarily come into play. 
A college establishing a professional team would have little in 
the way of defenses against a government challenge.75 To be sure, 
the revenue produced might be used for educational purposes, but 
that could be said about the revenue from any profit-making activ-
ity undertalcen by a college-NYU's macaroni operation and Co-
lumbia's hypothetical department store, for example. That the rev-
enue will be put to good use, and that the burden of any tax would 
therefore fall on deserving persons, 76 will not protect a college from 
the tax on unrelated business income.77 Neither of the purposes 
74. See supra notes 18~31 and accompanying text. 
75. Certainly the college would have forfeited any argument that its athletic program 
was not &n unrelated trade or business because "substantially all the work in carrying on 
such trade or business is performed ... without compensation." I.R.C. § 513(a)(1) (1982). 
Even without open professionalization, however, that argument was unliltcly to prevaiL See 
supra note 57. 
76. Bittker and Rahdert point out that 
[b]y reducing the amount that the exempt organization can apply to its charitable 
... purposes, the tax necessarily burdens the beneficiaries of these activities, and 
their ability to pay ought to be considered in deciding whether and to what extent to 
impose the tax. Yet it was evidently never suggested during the 1950 and 1969 de-
bates thnt the tax on the unrelated business income of charitable organizations re-
flected the ability to pay of those affected by it. Almost certainly ... it did not, and 
thus made the income ta.a more regressive. 
Bittlter & Rahdert, supra note 40, at 325-26 (footnote omitted). 
77. The statute requires determining whether the conduct of the activity is not 11su.b-
stantially related" to the organization's ta.'C-exempt purpose without regard to "the need of 
such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived." I.R.C. § 
513(a) (1982). 
If the organization uses "unrelated" funds to further "related" projects, it might seem 
that the unrelated business income should be reduced by the amount of a deemed charitable 
contribution. However, it is unclear that such a deemed transfer constitutes a "contribu-
tion" at all. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982). Even if it does, the amount of any deductible chari-
table contribution may not exceed 10% of the unrelated business taxable income (computed 
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behind the tax, protecting the Treasury and preventing unfair 
competition,78 would be served if the tax could be so easily 
circumvented. 
Nor will a college that establishes a professional sports pro-
gram be able to defend successfully on the basis that there are no 
other, competing professional teams in the vicinity of the campus. 
It will not be sufficient, that is, to argue that one of the purposes 
behind the tax, preventing unfair competition, would not be served 
by the tax's application. As an initial matter, the "no competition" 
model is probably not accurate: regardless of location, a college 
team does, in fact, compete with professional teams through broad-
casting. More important, the terms of the Internal Revenue Code 
do not require that actual competitors exist for the tax to apply; 
the Treasury regulations suggest that the likelihood of unfair com-
petition can be inferred if the statutory requirements are met.70 
Judicial authority is to the same effect: the tax is not limited to 
income earned by a trade or business that operates in competition 
with taxpaying entities.S" 
Under existing law, colleges quite simply have no clear protec-
tion from taxation of income attributable to professional sports. A 
college considering the creation of an openly professional sports 
team should be aware, therefore, that the step may have far-reach-
ing and undesirable tax consequences. And as the next section dis-
cusses, the consequences are not fully predictable. What are the 
dimensions of the "unrelated trade or business" to which the tax 
applies? 
without regard to the contribution). I.R.C. § 512(b)(10) (1982). Cf. supra note 51 (limit on 
deductibility of charitable contributions by corporation). 
78. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text. 
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-l(b) (1975) (activity meeting statutory requirements "presents 
sufficient Iihelihood of unfair competition to be within the policy of the tax"). Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court noted in its most recent pronouncement on the unrelated business income 
tax, the lnclt of competitors may evidence the competitive advantages provided the exempt 
entity. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 106 S. Ct. 2426, 2431 & n.2 (1986) 
("ABE's tax·exempt status would make it difficult for private firms to compete"). 
80. Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217 v. United States, 580 F.2d 270, 273·74 (8th Cir. 
1978) (income from bingo game operated by social welfare organization is unrelated business 
income); see Smith-Dodd Businessman's Ass'n v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 620, 624 (1975) 
("unfair competition plays a relatively insignificant role in the application of the ... unre· 
lated business tax"); Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1467·68. Acutely aware of the special place of 
bingo in American life, Congress provided statutory relief in 1978, overruling the specific 
result in Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217. See Pub. L. No. 95·502, § 301(a), 92 Stal 1693, 
1702 (1978) (addillg I.R.C. § 513(f)). 
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V. THE TAXABLE ACTIVITY 
The analysis, to this point, is easily summarized: a college that 
establishes an openly professional sports program will have a trade 
or business that is regularly canied on and that is not substantially 
related to the college's exempt educational purposes. Accordingly, 
a tax will be imposed on any unrelated business taxable income of 
the activity. That does not, however, end the analysis. The identity 
of the taxable activity is not so clear, particularly if a college does 
not professionalize its entire athletic pmgra.;11.S1 
If the appropriate trade or business is deemed to encompass 
the school's entire athletic program, the losses and other deduc-
tions attributable to nonrevenue sports may be used to offset in-
come from the revenue-raisers." Most big-time schools expend all 
or substantially all of their athletic revenues to support athletics 
generally,•• and any tax liability might therefore disappear. If this 
is the proper analysis, the tax on unrelated business income would 
be merely an irritant to a college, resulting in no additional dollars 
flowing to the Treasury. Moreover, because all unrelated trades 
and businesses are aggregated in computing unrelated business in-
come," a college with an over·allloss from an athletic program in a 
particular year could use the loss to offset income from other unre-
lated enterprises. Treating the entire athletic program as an tmre-
lated trade m· business in these circumstances could therefore even 
provide a temporary benefit to a college. •• 
If, however, the unrelated trade or business is determined to 
be only a single revenue-raising team or a gmup of revenue-raising 
teams, the tax results are obviously quite different. Football teams 
81. Because few sports are revenue producers, it is unlikely that all of a college's ath-
letic teams would be openly professionalized. 
82. See l.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (1982); Treas. Reg.§ !.512(a)-1(n) (1976). This !!Ssumes that 
the losses and deductions would be treated as "directly connected with the carrying on of 
the trade or business." 
83. See supra note 38. 
84. Treas. Reg. § !.512(a)-l(a) (1976) provides: 
In the case of an organization which derives gross income from the regular conduct of 
two or more unrelated business activities, unrelated business taxable income is the 
aggregate of gross income from all such unrelated business activities less the aggre-
gate of the deductions allowed with respect to all such unrelated business activities. 
See B. HoPIUNS, supra note 45, at 618. 
85. The fact that other income may be offsel by athletic program losses in particular 
taxable years does not permit a college to shelter such income forever. Because a. trade or 
businens is characterized by a search for profit, see supra note 57 and accompanying te~Lt, an 
athletic program generating perpetual losses might well not be treated as a trnde or business 
to begin with. 
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by themselves are often hugely profitable;•• a tax imposed on the 
revenue of such an enterprise could severely deplete university 
coffers.87 
Determination of the boundaries of a trade or business is de-
pendent on the facts of each case, and it is therefore impossible to 
state a conclusion applicable in all situations. Nevertheless, there 
is little doubt that the Internal Revenue Service would seek to 
treat any profitable component of a larger athletic program as a 
separate trade or business, and would therefore measure the tax by 
the net revenue of that component alone. 
Each activity of an exempt organization is potentially a trade 
or business. Under an amendment made by the Tax Reform Act of 
1969, the Internal Revenue Code gives the Service authority to 
"fragment" the activities of an otherwise exempt organization: "an 
activity does not lose identity as a trade or business merely be-
cause it is carried on within a larger aggregate of similar activities 
or within a larger complex of other endeavors which may, or may 
not, be related to the exempt purposes of the organization."•• 
Thus, the Service may break down even an apparently integrated 
operation into smaller parts. •• 
The fragmentation can result in some very fine particles. For 
example, the Service has ruled that an exempt blood bank's com-
mercial sales of blood plasma had to be further subdivided: plasma 
acquired for resale generated income from an unrelated trade or 
business, but plasma produced as a by-product of providing blood 
products to hospitals did not.•• Similarly, sales made by university 
bookstores must be fragmented into educational and noneduca-
tional components.•• Sales made by the store of an exempt mu-
86. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
87. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
88. I.R.C. § 513(c) (1982) (as added by Tnx Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91·172, § 
12l(c), 83 Stat. 487, 542-43). The Code was amended to clarify that advertising revenues 
from publications of exempt organizations were potentially subject to tax. 
The "fragmentation" approach was first promulgated in regulations in 1967, Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.513-l(b) (1975}, but the regulations were held invalid under the then existing form of 
the statute. See Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. United States, 514 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1975); 
American College of Physicians v. United States, 530 F.2d 930 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Congress subM 
sequently validated the fragmentation approach by amending the Code in 1969. See United 
States v. American College of Physicians, 106 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (1986}; Donahue, supra note 
45, at § 27.04[1]; Shillingburg, American CoiJege of Physicians v. United States: An EndM 
ing-A Beginning-Or?, 64 TAXES 539, 541-43 (1986). 
89. See Hopkins & Kaplan, supra note 57, at 41. 
90. Rev. Rul. 78-145, 1978·1 C.B. 169. 
91. See B. HoPKINS, supra note 45, at 641. The required fragmentation would in fact 
lead to three categories of businesses. The sale of directly educational material, such as 
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seum also must be broken down into "utilitarian" and "nonu-
tilitarian" categories."' 
If sales made by an exempt organization-even sales of fungi-
ble items such as blood plasma-do not constitute a single trade or 
business, there is no reason to believe that a college's athletic pro-
gram could avoid fragmentation. The intercollegiate teams them-
selves provide one obvious basis for an accounting breakdown, and 
other components (such as broadcasting) can be imagined as well. 
Unde1· the fragmentation approach, the Internal Revenue Service 
could reasonably single out certain teams (those concerned vvith 
revenue-raising) for treatment as unrelated trades or businesses 
and consequently impose the tax on the net revenue attributable 
to those teams. The colleges would not be permitted to offset that 
income with the expenses and losses attributable to other parts 
(the "substantially related" parts) of the athletic program. Under 
this analysis, a college that chose to professionalize its athletic pro-
gram would be subject to the most painful application of the 
tax-to the net revenue of its money-making sports. With the cur-
rent state of the law and the judicial deference generally accorded 
to the Service, a significant risk exists that such an application 
would be upheld in court. 
One final point deserves mention. A college is placed in a stra-
tegic quandary if application of the tax on unrelated business in-
come becomes a real possibility. The college will generally prefer 
that no part of the athletic program be treated as an unrelated 
trade or business and it will frame its litigation position accord-
ingly. Once a determination is made that a revenue-raising sport is 
an unrelated trade or business, however, the college has an incen-
tive to argue that the nonrevenue-raising sports are also unrelated 
trades or businesses. Only if such an argument pt·evails can the 
losses from those sports offset the income from the revenue-raisers. 
Yet the arguments in support of this alternative position are dia-
meti·ic to those the college must advance in support of its primary 
books and supplies, would be treated as substantially related to the exempt purposes; the 
sale of some other items, such as sundry goods, would probably be protected from tax under 
the convenience doctrine, see supra note 57; and the sale of still other items, such as cloth. 
ing and plants, would generate unrelated business income. B. HoP!CINS, supra note 45, at 
641. 
92. See B. HoPmNs, supra note 41, at 111. Hopkins cites Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,949 
(July 16, 1982): "If the primary purpose of the article is utilitarian and utilitarian aspects 
are the predominant reasons for the production and sale of the erticle, it should not be 
considered related." See also Rev. Rul. 85-110, 1985-2 C.B. 166 (laboratory worlt done at 
eJ~empt hospital for private patients of staff physicians is unrelated trade or business). 
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litigation position; the college cannot press the alternative without 
undercutting its primary contention. Thus, the effects of the tax on 
unrelated business income, when application of the tax to a col-
lege's athletic program becomes more than a theoretical possibility, 
are impossible to escape and difficult to contain. 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
An openly professional system, in which colleges hire athletes 
to represent them in competition, would open the door to the In-
ternal Revenue Service's reconsideration of the tax status of major 
college athletics. The present system is characterized by hypocrisy, 
but it is hypocrisy that colleges discard at their peril. 
If the hypocrisy is discarded, colleges may be subjected to the 
tax on unrelated business income. The unrelated trades or busi-
nesses that will be taxed may be limited to the profitable portions 
of the overall athletic enterprise, thereby substantially reducing 
the revenues available to the colleges. 
Of course, none of this necessarily means that a big-time ath-
letic college should not establish a professional football team. The 
tax on unrelated business income is only one of a number of fac-
tors for a college to consider, and other considerations-such as 
the purpose of the institution-are ultimately far more important 
than the effects of the Internal Revenue Code. Nevertheless, the 
effects of. the tax should not be ignored. Many steps that seem full 
of economic promise appear considerably less favorable when the 
tax consequences are analyzed. 
